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Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours:
Agency Vs. Specific-Capital
ABSTRACT
Most models of implicit lifetime contracts imply that at any particular
point in time, workers' wages and value of marginal product (VMP) will
diverge. As a result, the contract will have to specify hours as well as
wages, since firms will desire to prevent workers from working more when the
wage is greater than VMP and from working less when the wage is less than
VMP. this divergence, combined with the fact that in efficient contracts,
the hours are set so that VMP equals the marginal value of leisure, implies
that workers will face binding hours constraints. We show that the two
major models of lifetime contracts, the agency model and the firm-specific
capital model, make opposite predictions regarding the relation between work
hours constraints and job tenure. We test these predictions. Our results
indicate that neither model of efficient long-term contracts explains the
observed pattern of hours constraints. Therefore, we briefly consider other
explanations.
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(714) 856-5189 (714) 856-6205Most models of implicit lifetime contracts imply thatat any particular
point in time, workers' wages and value of marginal product (VMP) will
diverge. As a result, the contract will have to specify hoursas well as
wages, since firms will desire to prevent workers from working more when the
wage is greater than VMP and from working less when thewage is less than
VMP. As discussed below, this divergence, combined with the factthat in
efficient contracts, the hours are set so that VMPequals the marginal value
of leisure, implies that workers will facebinding hours constraints.
We show here that the two major models of lifetimecontracts, the agency
model and the firm-specific capital model, makeopposite predictions
regarding the relation between work hours constraints and job tenure. We
test these predictions. Our results indicate that neither model of
efficient long-term contracts explains the observedpattern of hours
constraints. Therefore, we briefly consider other explanations.
I. Hours constraints under lifetimecontracting
There are two major models of lifetimecontracting in the labor market,
an agency model and a firm specific capital model. These models differ
primarily in their assumptions about which parties are assumed to fulfill
the lifetime contract automatically. Kuhn (1986) offersa useful framework
for considering these assumptions. Either firmor worker can renege on the
contract, and there are two qualitatively differentways of reneging:
withdrawing, i.e. worker quitting or firms laying off (in Kuhn's
terminology, malfeasance by unilateral withdrawal), and not fulfilling the
specifics of the contract (in Kuhn's terminology, malfeasanceby altering2
the terms of the contract), e.g. worker shirking or firms payinglower
wages than agreed.
The agency model developed in Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear
(1979, 1981) is oriented toward worker malfeasance by alteringthe terms of
the contract (i.e. workers cheating, for instance stealing). Tominimize
inefficient cheating, firms and workers develop lifetime contractsin which
a disproportionate amount (relative to productivity)of worker compensation
is received toward the end of the contract. While firm malfeasance may
occur, for much of this literature, the probabilityof firm malfeasance is
assumed to be independent of the contract. In the simplest model, thereis
no firm malfeasance whatsoever.
The agency model leads to a specific relationship between the hours
constraints that workers face and their tenure. Although the nature of
hours rigidity can be demonstrated in a much more general agency model
(Lazear, 1981), the essence of this theory can be developed in a simple two
period model in which workers' sole opportunity for cheating occursin
between periods. To isolate the effect of worker cheating, we assume no
specific human capital. (There may or may not be general human capital.)
Let w., VMP and h. represent the wage, value of marginal product and hours
of the worker at the firm in the i'th period (i=l,2) and w ,VMP ,andh
a a a
represent wage, VMP, and hours at the alternative job if theworker works
there in the second period. Workers will not cheat provided that
(1) U2(w2,h2) > 1J2(W,h) +B
where U2 is utility in the second period and B is the immediate benefit of
cheating to the worker, defined in utility terms.3
A worker who cheats goes to the alternative firm for thesecond period
and receives his VMP there.(Note that there is no additional opportunity
for cheating in the alternative firm.) Since thismodel assumes no specific
capital, VMP in the second period is the same in both theoriginal and the
alternative firm. Thus,
(2) VMP VMP w
2 a a
Following Lazear, for simplicity, hourly VMP is assumed to beindependent of
hours worked.
Both the two-period contract at this firm and theone-period contract at
the alternative job will be efficient. Efficientcontracts require that
hours be set so that the value of amarginal hour of leisure equal VMP.
This, together with (2), means that second period hours will be thesame
whether the worker remains at the original firmor cheats and moves to the














where r is the discount rate. Since w2 >VMP2, (5) implies that
(6) w1 <VMP1
Because of (4) and (6), firms will restrict lowtenure workers from working
fewer hours, while leaving them free to workmore hours; the opposite is
true for high tenure workers.14
Furthermore, these constraints will be binding: since, in
efficient contracts, hours are set to equate VMP to the value of leisure,
the value of leisure exceeds the wage for low tenure workers who therefore
will want to work less than contracted, while the wage exceeds the marginal
value of leisure for high tenure workers who therefore will want to work
more than contracted. These predictions are tested here.
Extending this result to a multiperiod model could either resultin a
generally upward sloping wage-tenure profile, below VMP isearlier periods
and greater than the VMP in later periods, or it could result in a
discontinuous pattern with a bond posted by the worker in the first period
and wage equal to VMP otherwise, except for a large final period premium.
Which pattern arises depends on assumptions made about other aspects of the
model: whether firm malfeasance is endogenous, relative rates of time
preference, etc.2 The predictions about hours constraints would nothold
for the completely discontinuous pattern where bonds are posted before the
worker begins work and repaid after the worker completes his worklife.
However, it is clear that wage profiles do not have this pattern, since we
generally do not observe large bonds posted at the commencement of thework
relation. (See Lang and Kahn, 1987, for a survey of the literature on
bonding.)
The implications of the agency model regarding hours constraints
contrast sharply with the specific human capital model of Mincer (1974),
Becker (1971) and later authors, which assumes that both workers and firms
may break the implicit contract by withdrawing (quits or layoffs).Firm-
specific human capital makes it desirable for workers and firms tomaintain
long term employment relationships, and withdrawal of either partyis5
discouraged by sharing in the investment in human capital. The investment
is shared by setting wages in earlyyears above the VMP but below
alternative wages. The implications of this model for hoursrestrictions
can once again be shown in the context of a two-period model. Our model is
similar to that developed in Parsons (1972) butincorporates hours
restrictions.
Firm-specific capital is modeled by assuming that VMP is higher in the
second period if the worker remains with the same firm.3 Thus
(7) VMP1 <VMP2.
The employment relationship can only be terminated, eitherby worker or
firm, at the beginning of the second period.
The wage profile of a lifetime contract ensures that the firmhas no
incentive to fire the worker in the second period, i.e. that
(8) VMP2 >w2.
Given (8), ex post the firm would like the worker tosupply more hours. It
will restrict high tenure workers from working fewerhours, but leave them
free to work more.
The relationship between VMP andwages in the first period can be
derived from the profit maximization condition (5).Equations (5) and (8)
together require that
(9) VMP1 <w1.
Thus, the firm will restrict low tenure workers from workingmore hours, but
leave them free to work fewer.
Will these constraints be binding on workers? Efficientcontracts will
ensure that the value of a marginal hour of leisure is equal to thehourly
VMP. Therefore, condition (9) implies that in the firstperiod, the6
marginal value of leisure is less than the hourly wage and workers will, ex
post, want to work more hours than originally contracted. Likewise,
condition (8) implies that second period workers will want to work fewer
hours.
Mandatory retirement can be seen as an extreme hours constraint, where
hours are constrained to equal zero. Carmichael (1986) and Lazear (1979, p.
1264) suggest that the existence of mandatory retirement demonstrates that
wages must exceed VMP at the end of the contract. However,it is possible
to to have mandatory retirement even in models where wage is less than VMP
at the end of the contract.4
The empirical work below tests the alternative theories of long term
work relations by looking at the relation between hours constraints and job
tenure, Of course, since long-term relations are not the only factor which
can account for such constraints, our discussion of the empirical work also
considers other explanations.
II. An empirical model
In order to assess the relationship between tenure and hours
constraints, we translate the theoretical model into an empirical model in
the following way. Let:
(10) in w. =X.B+btenure. +e
1 1 1 1 1li
(11) in VMP.X.B +btenure. +e
1i2 2 12i
where w is the wage, X is a vector of worker characteristics, the B's7
represent vectors of coefficients, and the e's are randomerror terms.
Equation (10) is a standard wage equation and is consistentwith both the
agency and human capital interpretations of the return to tenure. VMPis
modeled analogously to the wage.
The probability that desired hours exceedcontract hours is the
probability that w exceeds VMP or
(12) Pr[desjred hours>hoursJPr[ X.(B1-B2) +(b1-b2)terjure+(e1.-e2.)>0
The test of the agency model versus thespecific capital model is a test of
whether b1 is greater than or less thanb2, that is whether wages rise more
rapidly or less rapidly than VMP. Note that weare concerned with the total
effect of tenure on VMP including bothgeneral and specific training.
Consequently, the experience variable included in the Xvector must be
experience prior to taking the job.
The zero profit condition requires thatlifetime discounted wages equal
lifetime discounted VMP. It can be shown thatimposing this condition
implies that B1 equals B2 except for the constant term.5Thus, if tastes
are forecast perfectly, the only variables which shouldenter equation (12)
are tenure and the constant. However, morereasonably we may assume
imperfect foresight, in which case variables suchas number of children or
health which may not be known to the firm andworker prior to the contract
may also enter the equation.6
The models of lifetime contracts describedin the previous sections
assume that all workers are constrained to workmore or fewer hours than
they wish. As discussed below, in practicesome workers are apparently8
content with the number of hours that they work. We consider two
modifications of the model which are consistent with this fact. First,
workers may not be concerned with small deviations from their desired number
of hours so that workers only desire more hours if VMP exceeds the wage by
some finite amount d. In this case, it is appropriate to estimate equation
(12) as an ordered probit.
A second possibility is that not all workers are employed in jobs
covered by long-term (implicit) contracts and that workers who respond that
they are not hours-constrained are in fact in spot markets. In this case,
it is appropriate to estimate (12) as a standard probit using only those
workers who desire more or fewer hours than they actually work.7 We use
both approaches in this paper.
IV.Data
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Our data
are drawn from the 1981 and 1982 waves of the PSID and refer to 1981 jobs.
We have not excluded individuals from the SEO sample since experience with
the PSID indicates that sample selection bias from inclusion of the low wage
sample is not significant for later years (see e.g. Dickens and Lang, 1985).
The PSID poses the following questions. It asks workers if there was
more work available on any of their jobs last year. If more work was not
available, the respondent is asked whether he would have liked to work more.
Respondents who report that they did not want to work more (or who had more
work available) are then asked if they could have worked less had they
wanted to. Those who could not have worked less are asked if they would
have liked to work less even if that would have meant earning less money.9
These questions allow us to create variables for "more workavailable,"
"wants to work more," and "wants to work less;" however,we cannot create a
variable for "able to work less", since this was not asked of workers who
wanted to work more.8 Note that the wording of the question doesnot
specify whether it refers to more/less hours of work per day, hoursper week
or weeks per year.
There are a number of difficulties with these questions. The initial
question asks whether more work was available onany of the respondent's
jobs. A worker with a second job with flexible hours who would have
preferred additional work on his primary job would respond thatmore work
was available even though his primary job was constrained. Weexperimented
with treating workers who were paid less in a secondjob than in their
primary job as constrained. The results were similar to those basedon the
question responses.
A second problem is that it is not clear thatany of the questions as
phrased, especially the "more work available" question, ismeaningful for
most salaried jobs, including many professional andmanagerial jobs. A
significant number of individuals for whom "more work was available" also
responded that their hourly rate of pay for additional work waszero. As a
result we limit our sample to workers who arepaid for additional hours of
work.
A final issue is what rate ofpay individuals are considering when they
say they would like to work more. One possibility is that firms are
reluctant to pay a premium for overtime whichmany workers would like to
obtain. In fact, wanting to work more is lesscommon among workers who
would get an overtime premium if they worked additional hoursthan among10
those who would receive only their straight time wage. In addition, the May
1985 Current Population Survey asked workers whether they would like to earn
more, fewer or the same number of hours at the same rateof pay.9 When the
sample is restricted in a fashion analogous to our sample, the responses are
almost identical; 35% desire more work, while 8% desire less work. Although
the responses to the CPS and PSID questions are significantly different in
the statistical sense, when one takes into account the different sample
years, the responses appear quite similar, and it does not seemthat the
high proportion of workers who want more hours is solely an artifactof the
question wording although, of course, we cannot discount the possibility
that there is some difficulty of this sort.
Despite these difficulties there is evidence from other studies that
these questions are meaningful. Ham (1982) finds that the labor supply
behavior of constrained and unconstrained workers differs. Altonji and
Paxson (1987) find that workers who are constrained to work fewer hours than
they wish tend, when they change jobs, to move to jobs with more hours and
to get less of a compensating differential for doing so.
One concern is that workers who respond that they desire to work less
are actually referring to self-imposed constraints, as opposed to employer-
imposed ones. They would like to work less even if that would mean earning
less money now, but are not prepared to work less because of the deleterious
impact that would have on the development of their careers or their
prospects for promotion. This might be expected to be especially true of
people in management types of positions or at formative stages of their
careers. To investigate this possibility, we examined the occupation,
experience, and tenure of the 32 members of our sample who say they would11
have liked to work less. Only two weremanagers. The rest were mostly
operatives (15), clerical workers (3), or skilled mechanics and craftspeople
(9). These were not people in formative years of their careers: Their
average level of prior experience was 10.6 years and average amount of
tenure 9.2 years, compared to averages in the total sample of 9.5 and 8.0
respectively.
As a further check on whether workers who respond that they want to
work less are referring to self-imposed constraints, we looked at the
responses of self-employed workers (whom we excluded from our sample.)
Presumably, self-employed workers are generally free to reduce their hours,
and the responses to the PSID questions would reflect this. Of 164prime
age male workers who reported that they were self-employed, 3 responded that
they would have liked to work less even if that would have meant earning
less money. This proportion is only slightly less than forour sample of
wage earners (32/759). However, of these three, two appear to represent
coding errors or misinterpretation of the category "self-employed": one of
the workers was paid a salary and worked thirty-five hoursper week as a
retail manager. A second, a composer or musician, worked fewerweekly hours
on his self-employed "main" job than on his "second" job where he received
an hourly rate of pay; furthermore, the amount that he said he would be paid
for additional work was equal to his second job's hourlywage. It therefore
appears that he wanted to work less at his work for others, i.e. his second
job.
The third self-employed person worked sixty-five hoursper week and
appears to own a tire or battery retail outlet. We surmise that he felt
that long hours were necessary to keep his business going; thus his12
constraints were self-imposed, in the sense that we have been using that
term. Thus, one self-employed person interpreted the question too broadly,
for our purposes. Note, that this is only one of the 62 managers!
administrators in the self-employed sample, and only one of the 79 self-
employed men who worked 50 hours/week or more.
In sum,weconclude that a very small number of respondents may
interpret the question "would you have preferred to work less even if you
had earned less money?" as including self-imposed constraints. However,
the likelihood of this being true among the non-self-employed is even less
than of it being true among the self-employed, both because of the
occupational distribution of the 32 people in our (non-self-employed) sample
who desired to work less and because it seems more likely for a self-
employed worker to interpret the question as including self-imposed
constraints than it is for an employee.
Empirical tests of models of lifetime contracts should be limited to
those workers who are likely to be in potentially long-term employment
relations. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to working male heads of
households, age 25 to 54 who are not self-employed and receive a wage or a
salary. 'We exclude agricultural, government and private household workers,
and limit ourselves to workers for whom all data were available on all items
used in the analysis. The final sample consists of 759 workers.
In our initial work, we distinguished between workers who were covered
by a collective bargaining agreement and those who were not since the
relation between hours constraints and job tenure in union firms is likely
to partially reflect intraunion decision-making. (For instance, union work
rules are likely to give greater choice of work hours to more senior13
workers.) However, in no case could we reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients for the two samples were identical. We thereforerestrict our
analysis to the combined union and nonunion samples.
Our explanatory variables are drawn from a list oflikely candidates
for wage and hours equations for adult males -- whetheror not the
individual lives in an SMSA (SMSA), white versus nonwhite(WHITE), married
versus other (MARRIED), the highest grade completed (EDUCATION), whether
health limits his work (BAD HEALTH),years of potential experience prior to
this job (PRIOR EXP.) measured byage at start of job minus education minus
6, and its square (PRIOR EXP.**2), number of children in the household
(CHILDREN), whether or not the worker's job is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement (UNION), and years of tenure (TENURE).
A difficulty arises because hours constraintsmay exist for reasons
other than the divergence of thewage and VMP. Our major concern in this
respect is underemployment or work sharing. In a market wherewage
rigidities or other factors prevent instantaneous marketclearing, employers
may respond to periods of low demand by cutting back workers' hours instead
of by layoffs, especially if there aresignificant rehire costs. In a Baily
(l974)/Azariadis (1975) implicit contracts framework,constancy of the wage
and variation of hours over the business cycleimply that in low demand
periods, workers' wages will exceed their reservationwage or value of
leisure, and they will desire to work more. If such workshortages are
correlated with tenure, our estimates will be biased. In orderto control
for the effect of underemployment, we included the localunemployment rate
and, in some specifications, weeks unemployed during theyear.14
We did little experimentation with the choice of the remaining
variables with the exception of the tenure variable. We experimented with
adding either tenure squared or tenure multiplied by the age atwhich the
individual started his job. The first allows for a nonlinear tenure effect
while the second takes into account the possibility that expected tenure may
vary with the age at which the individual started the job.In none of the
specifications which we tried did either of these variables approach
significance. We also tried imposing the functional form for tenure implied
by profit maximization)0 The results were almost identical to those
reported below, which is not surprising given the .9 correlation between
tenure and the modified tenure variable.
V. Results
While our primary focus is on the relationship between hours
constraints and tenure, if hours constraints were not widespread, that alone
would cast doubt on the relevance of models of lifetime contracts. In fact,
we find considerable evidence of the importance of hours constraints. Only
aboutU 15% of our sample are free to vary their hours in both directions.
43% can work neither more nor less, 15% can work more but not less, and 27%
can work less but not more. Adjusting these figures for workers in second
jobs which pay less than their primary job and for salaried workers who are
not paid for overtime would further increase the extent to which workers are
unable to work extra hours.
In addition, these constraints are binding for a large proportion of
workers. Fully 41% of the workers in our sample would prefer to work more
if more work were available. On the other hand, only 4% would prefer to15
work less. Thus, while hours constraintsare widespread, they are
overwhelmingly in the direction of making workers' hours less than,not more
than, they desire. The difference between theproportion of workers
constrained to work fewer hours than they desire and theproportion
constrained to work more hours than they desire isstriking. Dickens and
Lundberg (1985) also find that most workers work fewer hours thanthey wish.
Since their study used markedly differing methods anddifferent data, the
similarity of the findings provides strong confirmation for the result.
To cast light on the relationship between tenureand hours constraints,
we begin by looking at the mean level of tenure for workers whowish to work
more, fewer, or the same number of hours that they presently work. The
results provide weak support for the specificcapital model. Mean tenure is
8.0 years for workers who are satisfied with theirhours, 7.8 years for
those who desire more hours and 9.2years among those who wish to work fewer
hours. However, these differences are notsignificant at conventional
levels.
To examine the relationship between tenure andhours constraints while
controlling for the effects of other variables, we turn to theprobit
estimates in Table 1. The first columngives the results of an ordered
probit in which the highest category is "wantsmore work", the middle
category is "wants neither more nor less work", and the lowestcategory is
"wants less work". A positive coefficient thereforeindicates that the
variable tends to increase the probability that theindividual desires more
work. The ordered probit providesstrong evidence against the Lazear agency
model. Using a one-tail test, we can reject thepredicted positive sign on
tenure at the .05 level.16
In the second column, we restrict the sample to those workers who feel
constrained in one direction or the other. The estimates are therefore of a
standard probit with two categories, wants more and wants less. The
estimated effect of tenure in this model is somewhat less strong but remains
significant at the .05 level using a one-tail test.
While the remaining variables are not the primary focus of the paper,
we note in passing that there is strong evidence that whites are less likely
to be constrained to work fewer hours than they desire. It also appears
that married workers, more educated workers, and workers with few children
are less likely to be constrained to work fewer hours than they wish. The
effect of the local unemployment rate appears to operate in the direction
predicted by the underemployment model. The coefficient is significant at
the .05 level using a one-tail test in the ordered probit but falls far
short of conventional significance levels when unconstrained workers are
dropped from the sample.
Because the result for unemployment suggests that our results may be
affected by the presence of workers experiencing underemployment in the
sample, the third and fourth columns replicate the estimates but with weeks
of unemployment experienced by the individual included as an explanatory
variable. While the estimates are virtually unchanged for the standard
probit (column 4), the effect of tenure is substantially reduced in the
ordered probit and is significant at only the .1 level for a test of the
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero against the hypothesis that it is
negative. It therefore appears that the negative relationship between
tenure and wanting more work is due in part to the greater underemployment
experienced by relatively junior workers.17
The Lazear model is strongly rejected whenwe treat all constraints as
being derived from lifetime contracts. While it is true thatwhen we
attempt to eliminate the effect of underemployment, the evidenceagainst the
agency model is less compelling, the effect of tenure continues to be in the
Opposite direction from that predicted by the model.Moreover, testing
whether the tenure coefficient isnegative rather than zero provides a very
weak test of the agency model since that modelimplies that the coefficient
should be greater than zero. A "correct"test of the model would require
specification of the prior distribution of the tenure coefficientunder the
agency model. Implicitly, our test puts all of the weight of theprior
distribution at zero, when it shouldput weight on a range of points greater
than zero. Thus rejecting the "null"hypothesis even at the .1 level
represents strong rejection of the agency model.
While the negative tenure coefficientsmight be taken as weak support
for the specific-capital model, our overallfindings also appear to be
inconsistent with that model. Theoverwhelming majority of workers who face
binding constraints want to work more, not less. Since thefirm-specific
capital model implies that senior workers are constrainedto work less than
they wish, this is hard to reconcile with that model. Workerswould have to
be paid more than their VMP for an extendedperiod at the beginning of the
relationship and less than their VMP for avery short period at the end of
the relationship. However, givenequality of lifetime discounted wages and
lifetime discounted VMP1 this implies thatwages must be far below VMP
towards the end of the relationship. This isonly possible if either VMP
increases sharply towards the end of therelationship, which seems unlikely,
or if wages drop sharply, which simply does notoccur.18
A second way of making the same point is to note that the results imply
that an "average" worker would be constrained to work more hours than
desired only after tenure reaches about 100 years. We suspect that few of
the workers in our sample expect to remain with the same firm for this
length of time.
Moreover, the result is not robust to the choice of prior experience
rather than experience as an explanatory variable. While the long-term
relations model suggests that the proper parameterization uses prior
experience, this choice is by no means as clear for other models of hours
constraints. If experience rather than prior experience is used for the
first set of estimates, the effect of tenure is essentially zero (.002 with
a t-statistic of 0.3 for the ordered probit and .006 with a t statistic of
.4 for the two category probit in the first set of specifications). Since
we cannot rule out this choice of parameterization, our results provide only
weak support for the firm-specific capital model of long-term relations
where the wage is less than VMP at the end of the relationship.
VI. Other Explanations for Hours Constraints
While the primary objective of this paper was to test two models of
lifetime contracts, the failure of both models to explain hours constraints
moves us to at least consider some other explanations.
One obvious alternative explanation has been discussed somewhat already
-- hoursconstraints as a form of underemployment. While underemployment
cannot account for workers who are constrained to work more hours than they
wish, it is an attractive theory since most constraints take the form of
workers being employed for fewer hours than they wish. As a partial control19
for this form of underemployment,we included the local unemployment rate in
our specifications. We would expect to find apositive effect of the local
unemployment rate on wanting to work more, eventhough it is unlikely to be
a perfect control. As noted above, therelationship between hours
constraints and the unemployment rate, however,provides only very weak
support for this hypothesis. While the effect ofunemployment is
significant at the 5% level in the full sample orderedprobit, it does not
approach significance in the two category probit.
Similarly, there is no strong relationship between theunemployment
rate for the years 1968 to 1983 and theproportion of workers in each year
who are constrained for allworking heads of households interviewed by the
PSID, (see Table 2). The unemployment rate hasinsignificant relationships
with both the proportion of workers whosay they could work more (t .4) and
the nuniber who want to work less(t-.6), and in the latter case the
relationship is positive, Opposite to what theunemployment hypothesis would
predict. There is a significant, positiverelationship between unemployment
and wanting to work more, but this reflectsthe upward trend in both
unemployment and wanting to work more. If we includea time trend, the
relationship turns insignificant (t=l.3).(Including a time trend in "could
work more" and "want less work"regressions reverses the sign for the
latter, but still leaves them bothinsignificant.)
On the other hand, there doesappear to be a relationship between
personal unemployment experience and individuals'responses to the
questions. Weeks unemployed has a significant andpositive effect in the
ordered probit, although an insignificanteffect in the "more vs. less"
probit. 30% of the workers who want more work hadexperienced unemployment20
in the course of the year. A worker who experienced unemployment during the
year is much more likely to have wanted to work more: fully60% of those
members of our sample who had experienced unemployment said they would have
liked to work more compared with only 26% of those not experiencing
unemployment. Thus it appears that a substantial fraction of hours
constraints are associated with unemployment, but that the majority is not.
A second obvious source of hours constraints is technological. Often
the production technology requires that a number of workers be present
simultaneously. In an assembly line, for instance, there are likely to be
significant problems of coordination unless workers work the same shift.
Similarly, a receptionist or switchboard operator may be required for
exactly the period during which the firm is open for customers, If many or
most jobs are for a set number of hours per day or per week, there will be a
hedonic relation between wages and hours which matches workers who desire
long hours with firms which require long hours (see Moffitt (1984) for a
model in which the wage depends on the number of hours worked). In a model
with perfect mobility, each worker would be constrained to work a fixed
number of hours, but each worker would be employed in the job which, given
the wage/hours trade-off, required his preferred number of hours.
Therefore, while hours in any given job would not be flexible, no worker
would be constrained to work more or fewer hours than he desired. We find
some evidence of such job matching in our sample. The 41% of workers who
would like to work more hours are only slightly more than half of those who
could not have worked more.
However, if hours constraints were determined by the need for technical
coordination of schedules, hours would generally be rigid in both21
directions, so that workers would be constrained both from working more and
from working less. Of the workers in our sample constrainedby employers
(i.e. either having no more work available and/or not being able to work
less), approximately12 51% are constrained in both directions while the
remaining 49% are constrained in one direction only.
If workers acquire firm-specific human capital or have mobilitycosts,
they will tend to remain with the same firm even if their tastes for hours
of work change slightly, so that matching will not be perfect. Ofcourse,
potential workers will weigh their tastes for hours of work over the period
they remain with the firm, discounting for their probability of remaining
with the firm and for time preference. Nevertheless, atany point of time,
a worker will be constrained to work a different number of hours than he
currently desires. This will be more true for senior workers since their
tastes are more highly discounted. In fact, Kahn (1987) shows that, in the
case of safety, workers appear to take into account their tastes overa very
short horizon of about three years. Thismay reflect the fact that the
probability of staying in a new job for more than three years is quite low
(Hall, 1982).
Thus, if technological coordination is the explanation for hours
constraints, we would expect to see few junior workers andmany senior
workers facing binding hours constraints, and junior and senior workers
would be constrained in opposite directions. This could account for the
one-sidedness of hours constraints, as long as desired hours increased with
age. However, if desired hours increased with age, we would expect labor
supply also to increase with age. The labor supply literature shows no22
strong and consistent relationship of this sort (at leastfor prime age
males). Moreover, we do not observe senior workers being significantly more
constrained than junior workers.
In sum, it seems that technological coordination of schedules is likely
to be a significant determinant of hours constraints, but still only partof
the story.
A related explanation for hours constraints is the inter-firm
coordination problem and the historical development of workweek length. The
need for inter-firm coordination makes the standard workweek a public good,
from which it is difficult for firms to depart. It is possible that our
particular standard workweek, forty hours, is simply an accident of history,
reflecting past conditions, and that it is difficult to alter the standard
workweek. One problem with this explanation (aside from its deus ex machina
quality) is that minor deviations from the standard workweek (especially if
the deviations are increases) should not be particularly costly for most
firms so that if most workers are underemployed, there should be continual
upward pressure on the length of the standard week. Moreover, the fact that
historically there have been changes in the standard workweek suggests that
this theory cannot explain the observed persistent constraints on hours.
In sum, while lifetime contracts, underemployment and technological
coordination explain some aspects of observed hours constraints, none seems
to account for the large number of workers who must work fewer hours than
they wish. We suggest here two further possible explanations for hours
constraints. One explanation is that VMP declines as the length of the work
week increases (at least in the relevant range). If for some reason
(perhaps because of the overtime provisions of the FLSA), it is impossible23
to have the marginal hourlywage decline as VMPdeclines,an optimal
contract will specify wages and weekly hours. Since themarginal wage
exceeds marginal VMP and the optimal contractsets the marginal value of
leisure equal to marginal VMP, themarginal wage will exceed the marginal
value of leisure, and workers will want to workmore hours than originally
contracted. One difficulty with this explanation is thatit suggests that
firms should simply pay workers salaries ratherthan hourly wages. However,
it is possible that, when combined withan assumption of fluctuating demand,
this model could yield an explanation of boththe observed hours constraints
and payment in the form of hourlywages. A second problem is that we would
expect such hours constraints to be most prevalentamong those directly
affected by the FLSA overtime provisions.However, as noted above, workers
who would receive an overtimepremium for additional work are less likely,
not more likely, to want to work more.
Finally, we note that inefficient hours constraintsmay arise in a
shirking model. Although Lazear in hisagency model assumes that hours are
set at the first-best efficient level, thisassumption is justified only if
bonding is costless. Bonding may be costly because ofdifferences in
discount rates between workers and firms,costs of preventing firm
malfeasance, etc. Assuming that bonding iscostly is natural for two
reasons. First, the wage profile is determinateonly if bonding is costly
(Lazear 1979, 1981; Akerlof and Katz, 1986).Secondly, we would only
observe monitoring if bonding werecostly (Dickens, Katz and Lang, 1986).
When bonding is costly, hours will be set belowtheir efficient level
and therefore workers will tend to be constrainedto work fewer hours than
they desire. To demonstrate this, we present asimple model here with no24
bonding. A more general model can be found in Lang (1987). An employer
hires a single worker who must choose between shirking and not shirking.
Workers are paid in advance and are infinitely long-lived. If the worker is
caught shirking, he is dismissed, and for simplicity, it is assumed that the
worker is not rehired anywhere and has a shadow value of leisure equal to
zero.(A positive probability of rehire elsewhere or a positive value of
leisure would not change the results.) The probability that the worker is
caught shirking each period, q, increases with hours worked per period, h.
The marginal probability of being caught is a decreasing function of hours
(q''<O). If the worker does not shirk, he suffers disutility of effort, e,
that is increasing with h. The marginal disutility of effort on the job is
a nondecreasing function of hours worked each period (e''￿O))3 The
marginal product, v, is assumed constant, again for expositional simplicity.
Under these assumptions, the efficient number of hours each period
would set v equal to e'. Denote the wage by w and the discount rate by r.
If the worker shirks, his expected payment is the suni from zero to infinity
of wh(lq)t/(l+r)t, while if he doesn't shirk, his payment is the sum from
zero to infinity of (wh-e)/(1-4-r)t. Therefore, the condition that the worker
not shirk is,
(13) wh ￿ e(h)[1 +r/q(h)}.
The firm chooses hours to maximize profits equal to
(14) vh -whvh -e(h)*[1+r/q(h)J
where v is the hourly value of marginal product. Maximizing (14) with
respect to hours gives
(15) v e'[l +r/q]
-q'er/q2
or25
(16) v/e' 1 +(r/q)[1 -(e/e')(q'/q)].
Since e''￿O, e/e' is less than or equal to h. Similarly sinceq''<O, q'/q





which means that hours are set below their efficient level.
Moreover, competition ensures that the wage equals the value of
marginal product. Therefore the wage exceeds the marginal disutility of
employment, and workers are constrained to work fewer hours thanthey
desire.
VII. Conclusion
This paper provides strong evidence that mostwage earners face hours
constraints. Close to half of workers would like either to workmore or
fewer hours than they are, in fact, able to work.Most frequently, the
constraint takes the form of workers not being able to workas much as they
wish; in fact, about ten times as many workers want to work more thanwant
to work less.
Theories of long-term employment relationships predict hours
constraints. However, neither of the principal models of long-term
contracting, firm-specific capital and Lazear's agency model, suggests hours
constraints which are compatible with our findings.26
Without doubt, some constraints arise from the need to coordinate the
work schedules of different employees. However, the fact that many workers'
hours are only restricted in one direction and that being constrained to
work less than desired is so much more common than being constrained to work
more suggests to us a role for other determinants of hours constraints. At
the very least, if firms set hours to coordinate workers' schedules, we need
an explanation of why the schedules should be biased toward fewer hours than
workers desire.
Similarly, underemployment may be responsible for some of the workers
observed to want more work. The variety of empirical evidence we present on
unemployment, including the effect of the local unemployment rate and of
weeks unemployed in the cross section analysis and a time series analysis,
all indicate only very weak support for this explanation, except among
people who had themselves experienced unemployment during the year. Since
this is a limited sector, unemployment can account for some but not the
majority of hours constraints.
Additional explanations for the observed widespread hours constraints
must be found. We suggest two kinds of directions that could offer
solutions. One of these has been further developed in Lang (1987). Both
deserve additional theoretical development and empirical testing.27
TABLE 1
Probit Estimates of Wanting More vs. Less Work (Union/Nonunion)
Ordered More vs. Less Ordered More vs. Less
SMSA 0.014 0.248 0.021 0.248
(0.1) (1.1) (0.2) (1.1)
Married -0.203 -0.132 -0.176 -0.145
(1.4) (0.4) (1.2) (0.4)
Unemp. Rate 0.031 0.022 0.024 0.020
(1.7) (0.5) (1.3) (0.5)
Education -0.079 -0.087 -0.078 -0.084
(3.5) (1.7) (3.4) (1.6)
Children 0.106 0.130 0.114 0.151
(2.8) (1.4) (3.0) (1.6)
Bad Health 0.236 0.512 0.225 0.498
(1.2) (0.9) (1.1) (0.9)
White -0.397 -0.773 -0.357 -0.723
(4.1) (3.0) (3.7) (2.8)
Prior -0.036 -0.034 -0.032 -0.029
Experience (2.1) (1.0) (1.9) (0.8)
Prior Experience 0.071 0.010 0.046 -0.017
**2/100 (1.3) (0.1) (0.8) (0.2)
Tenure -0.013 -0.023 -0.009 -0.019
(1.9) (1.6) (1.3) (1.2)
Union -0.067 -0.207 -0.075 -0.225
(0.7) (1.0) (0.8) (1.0)
Weeks Unemployed - 0.047 0.043
(4.3) (1.4)
Loglikelihood-600.3 -93.4 -590.4 -92.1
T statistics are in parentheses.TABLE 2
Relationship Between Unemployment Rates and Hours Constraints








1968 3.6 37.1 18.9 5.8
1969 3.5 39.3 20.3 4.9
1970 4.9 39.0 21.5 5.7
1971 5.9 40.4 19.6 6.1
1972 5.6 40.9 18.4 6.0
1973 4.9 41.9 18.2 5.6
1974 5.6 41.1 22.0 5.1
1975 8.5 36.8 23.9 3.7
1976 7.7 41.8 21.3 6.2
1977 7.1 45.3 19.8 6.2
1978 6.1 45.5 19.6 7.5
1979 5.8 41.1 22.3 6.1
1980 7.1 43.4 23.5 5.4
1981 7.6 41.0 25.5 5.5
1982 9.7 37.6 27.8 5.529
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1. Lazear shows that these results holdeven in a more general model with
some firm malfeasance, particularly where there isimperfect information about some firms' default histories. Becausenot all firms default despite
a wage higher than the Vt'!? in later periods, there isstill an upward
sloping wage profile with all the implicationsdeveloped above.
2. See Akerlof and Katz (1986) and Lazear(1981). Also, if there are job
ladders where shirking or cheating isnot possible in early years, lowwages during this entire period can take the place ofa bond.
3. The assumption that the increase inVMP is exogenous greatly simplifies
the analysis. If the increase is treatedas endogenous, the theoretical
prediction is sensitive to modellingassumptions and to the choice of
parameter values in some models. For senior workers, allendogenous Vt'!? models lead to the same predictionas the exogenous model, i.e. that senior
workers will be constrained to workmore than they want. However,
endogenous VMP in some models may reverse our conclusionsabout junior
workers, so that junior workers will be constrainedto work more than they
want. The predictions that we develop here forexogenous VMP, therefore,
are true for many models of endogenous VMP.Moreover, the other endogenous
VMP models give predictions thatare immediately rejected by the data since
the empirical evidence discussed belowstrongly rejects a model which
implies that most workers are constrained to workmore than they want.
4. For example, mandatory retirementmight arise in an adverse selection
model such as Weiss (1980) or inan efficiency wage model similar to the one
described towards the end of thepaper.
5. The zero profit condition can. also beshown to imply that the
coefficient on tenure depends on theexpected probability of remaining at the firm until each tenure level, whichin a steady state can be calculated
from the distribution of tenure in thefirm.
6. This can be derived formallyby including actual and expected marginal
value of leisure equations andsolving for the ex ante optimal hours and the
ex post desired hours.
7. Whether this process leads tosample selection bias is a more complex
question than it might at firstappear. In essence the existence of sample
selection bias depends on whether weare interested in the effect of tenure
conditional on being in a long-term contract withhours constraints or
simply on the effect of tenure. Since we are interestedin the former,
there is no problem of sample selectionbias. This point was the subject of
a heated debate between Poirier and Ruud(1981) and Maddala (1983).
8.The exact questions are:
A. Now thinking about your job(s)over the past year, was there more work
available on (your job/any ofyour jobs) so that you could have worked more
had you wanted to?
31B. (asked only if answer to A is yes) How much would you haveearned per
hour?
C. (asked only if answer to A is no or don't know) Would you haveliked to
work more if you could have found more work?
D. (asked only if answer to A is yes or answer to C is no or don't know)
Could you have worked less if you had wanted to?
E. (asked only if answer to D is no or don't know) Would you have preferred
to work less even if you had earned less money?
9. The exact question was, "If you had a choice, would you prefer to work,
the same number of hours and earn the same money, fewer hours at the same
rate of pay and earn less money or more hours at the same rateof pay and
earn more money?
10. See footnote 6. We used cross-section data from the May 1979 CPS to
calculate the probability that a worker who started a job at a given age
would attain each level of tenure.
11. We cannot calculate some of these figures exactly because the question
"could you have worked less?" was not asked of workers who wanted to work
more but couldn't. Estimates were arrived at by assuming thatthe same
proportion of these workers have less work available as in the populationof
workers who couldn't work more and didn't want to.
12. Footnote 11 also applies here.
13. That q''<O arises naturally if, for example, being caught is a Poisson
process with constant arrival probability. That e''￿Ois just the standard
assumption of diminishing marginal utility.
32